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Introduction

36
One profound change within local governments' delivery of maintenance services in 37 urban parks and green spaces in many countries in the last four decades is a shift toward 38 greater reliance on private contractors -a shift that simultaneously has challenged and 39 reduced public authorities' reliance on in-house provision (Jones, 2000; Lindholst, 40 2009; Nuppenau, 2009 ). In a global perspective, the increased reliance on private 41 contractors in the public sector is one tangible result from the last four decades' reform 42 push promoting new organizational and managerial instruments and values based on a 43 neoliberal belief in 'markets' as superior mechanisms for improving the performance of 44 service delivery (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Hansen and Lindholst, 2016) . 45
Evaluations of whether the promises of neoliberal beliefs have been fulfilled as 46
well as what the broader outcomes are from the increased reliance on private contractors 47 for delivery of maintenance services in urban parks and green spaces have been covered 48 by a small number of studies over the years. The studies have within perspectives 49 confined to a single country context and particular time periods provided either 'narrow' 50 evaluations of a particular outcome such as difference in expenditure levels (e.g. Jang, 51 2006) or provided more rounded narratives reporting on a broader set of experiences 52 and outcomes (e.g. Jones, 2000) . However, no research has in a cross-national 53 perspective within the context of urban green space management gauged what is 54 hitherto known -and not known -about the outcomes for service delivery from the 55 increased reliance on private contractors. 56
With the aim of illuminating this 'grander puzzle', this article provides a review 57 of internationally available studies reporting on outcomes from public authorities' use 58 of contracting out for delivery of maintenance services in urban parks and green spaces 59 7 ongoing government coordination and control in order to ensure responsiveness toward 132 community needs. Based on the comparative characteristics, it can be argued that the 133 competitive model of contracting out can be expected to work relatively well for parks 134 and green space maintenance services in relation to economic performance but less so in 135 relation to other important aspects. 136
The competitive model of service contracting furthermore ingrains a distinct set 137
of governing values. The neoliberal belief in the market as a superior coordination 138 mechanism has through the NPM promoted core values in the public sector related to 139 competition, cost-effectiveness and productivity. Patterson and Pinch (1995) , for 140 example, observed that the implementation of contracting out in the UK encompassed 141 an organizational shift toward 'strategic centralization and operational decentralization' 142 as well as a shift toward a business and commercial discourse focused on 'efficiency', 143 'performance targets' and 'consumer needs.' These values seem somehow odd or differ 144 from traditional bureaucratic values, such as legality and procedural fairness supporting 145 a 'public ethos', as well as governing values promoted in management paradigms in 146 newer reform trends such as involvement, deliberation and flexibility in decentralized 147 searches of 'public value' within networks of stakeholders (Hood, 1991; Stoker, 2006) . process of 'hollowing out of the state' (Rhodes, 1994) . In the competition model private 153 contractors are intentionally engaged to deliver contracted services at the lowest 154 possible costs whereas in-house providers are directly governed by their political 155 8 constituencies within a hierarchical structure and can recurrently be required to serve 156 broader public purposes within a community or adapt to changing political preferences. 157
It follows that service delivery through in-house organizations is governed by a 158 different -if not more complex -set of values than the values governing the use of 159 private contractors through a competition model. In the institutional literature on 160 economic organization the difference between organizing production through markets 161 ('buy') versus hierarchies ('make') has been analysed in terms of comparative benefits 162 and costs (Williamson 1991) . In-house provision may have advantages such as greater 163 'allocative' efficiency (e.g. flexibility and ability to meet changing community needs 164 and user preferences) while contracting out may have the advantage in terms of greater 165 'technical' efficiency (plan and provide standard services at the lower cost). 166
The differences between in-house and market based approaches as well as how 167 contracting out is organized may, however, not be as clear cut as analytical models 168
suggest. New models for contracting out serving other purposes than cost-effectiveness 169 have been introduced through shifts in reform focus in some countries, such as the UK 170 (Boyne, 1999) The search in the web of science (within the social science and emerging 196 indices) used a syntax including: contract* OR privati* OR outsour* AND green* OR 197 park* OR ground* AND maintenance. The search generated 698 unique hits. Inspection 198 of titles and abstracts reduced the number of relevant titles to only three. In the show-199 balling two streams of research were inspected. The first stream comprised reviews of 200 outcomes from contracting out in the public sector by Borcherding et al. (1982) , 201 Donahue (1989) , Hirsch (1995) , Domberger (1997) , Boyne (1998) Given the broader scope of the research, a 'narrative' approach was adapted for 208 the review (Green et al., 2006) . A narrative approach allows for more detailed accounts 209 of reviewed evidence rather than summaries in either qualitative (e.g. summary of 210 positive or negative outcomes) or quantitative (e.g. calculation of effect sizes) terms. 211
Based on the narrative approach, the 13 titles identified in the literature search were 212 inspected and summarized through an inductive analytical process with regard to 1) any 213 findings on outcomes related to contracting out of park and green space maintenance 214 (reported outcomes), 2) any findings or discussion on factors which explain the reported 215 outcomes (explanations for outcomes), 3) the methods sustaining any finding or 216 conclusion (methods), and 4) contextual details of the studies (context). 217
218
Review of evidence 219 Altogether ten studies reported statistics as part of their key findings while three 234 studies reported findings in terms of qualitative accounts. In terms of data, seven studies 235 were purely quantitative, two studies were purely qualitative while four studies were 236 based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. Key data sources across the studies 237 included surveys and research interviews with key stakeholders while register-based 238 data and expert assessments were used in a few studies only. 239
240
Economic outcomes 241
Seven out of the 13 studies found cost reductions as a major (positive) outcome. Six of 242 these seven studies also indicated improved technical efficiency, i.e. the same service 243 level was provided at lower costs. Two studies found no significant differences in 244 service expenditure levels between contracting and non-contracting municipalities. One 245 study found substantial cost increases in contract prices while one study found that the 246 likelihood of no cost change was substantially higher than the chance for cost savings. In this context, competition -as well as the level of contracting out -was higher in the 289 more densely populated metropolitan areas. 290
Higher private productivity. All reviewed studies implicitly or explicitly stated 291 that productivity, i.e. producing the same output with fewer inputs, was higher in the 292 private sector than in the public sector. Walsh and Davis (1993), for example, reported 293 that among park managers it was believed that a key reason for cost reductions was 294 relatively higher private sector productivity. The reported cost savings by Lindholst 295 (2008) were attributed to a shift to full-scale contracting out and the abolition of a 296 former ineffective and poorly managed in-house arrangement. From findings in studies 297 14 by Berenyi and Stevens (1988) or Patterson and Pinch (1995) it is also evident that 298 higher private productivity has been achieved by substantial changes in the number of 299 employees, employee composition, work conditions and workforce management. 300
Change in service levels. Some studies prompted the importance of change in 301 service levels as a direct driver of cost change in contracting out. For example, Walsh 302 and Davis (1993) found a key reason for a part of the reported cost reductions was 303 changes toward lower standards for service quality while the main source for cost 304 increases was reported to be changes toward higher standards. 305
Government objectives. Based on the studies by Martin and Stein (1992) , 306 Patterson and Pinch (1995) and Jones (2000) , it can furthermore be argued that pursuit 307 of general government objectives in terms of cost reductions in contracting practices is a 308 key explanatory factor for the observed effects. In particular, it can be argued that 309 contracting out has been used as a means through which governments implement an 310 objective of cost reduction (as well as objectives related to reducing the number of staff 311 in public organizations). This is perhaps most evident in the policies on compulsory 312 competitive tendering in the UK which provided a tight regulation of the use of 313 contracting out as a clear cost-reducing mechanism (Dempsey et al., 2016) . A special 314 case, which also illuminates the importance of taking objectives into account, is the 315 study of contracting out in Norwegian municipalities by Leiren et al. (2016) . The study 316 found that the overriding reason for private service provision was a lack of in-house 317 capacity rather than cost concerns. 318
319
Service outcomes 320 15
Four studies reported overall neutral effects on service quality while four studies 321 reported negative effects and one study indicated positive effects on service quality. 322
Studies by Lindholst (2008) , Berenyi and Stevens (1988) , Walsh and Davis (1993) and 323 Clark (1997) found no overall negative direct effect on service quality. Walsh and Davis 324 (1993) found few reports of declining quality as an effect of contracting out. However, 325 changes in service standards were reported to affect cost levels (see above). Clark 326 (1997) found that 36percent of responding local authorities reported that quality levels 327 had decreased compared to 37 percent who reported that reported that quality levels 328 had increased. The two studies by Jones (2000) and Lindholst et al. (2015) reported 329 negative effects on service quality and they in particular indicated problems with 330 allocative efficiency, i.e. overall functionality of parks and their ability to satisfy user 331 needs, within public service delivery systems. The study by Jones (2000) found that 332 service levels / quality had generally declined by contracting out in the era of 333 compulsory competitive tendering in the UK and created run down and derelict park 334 areas low in horticultural and recreational value. Jones (2000) attributed that decline 335 partly to 'making parks fit for mowers rather than mowers fit the needs of the park' as 336 well as to a loss of community contact by shifts from site-based staff toward mobile 337 work gangs. The study by Lindholst et al. (2015) pointed out that service specifications 338 adopted for contracting out of grounds maintenance have drawbacks, as they tend to 339 limit the view on service quality to a question about compliance to pre-predefined 340 Table 2 around here **** 443 444 Table 2 provides a summary of the instances of positive, neutral and negative outcomes 445 reported for the four types of outcomes. A finding is that the overall evaluation of 446 outcomes is mixed. However, the tendencies are that reports on economic and 447 managerial/organizational outcomes on balance are positive while reports on service 448 and staff on balance are negative. Most instances of reported outcomes are, furthermore, 449 counted as economic outcomes (12 instances), followed by service outcomes (nine 450 instances), managerial/organizational outcomes (seven instances) and outcomes for staff 451
(five instances). 452
Across the reviewed studies it was notable that explanations for the various 453 outcomes were not systematically addressed or discussed and only a single study by 454 Berenyi and Stevens (1988) included systematic research on the reasons for 455 performance differences between public and private provision. Thus, the reviewed 456 studies themselves do not provide a systematic accumulation of a deeper or more 457 refined understanding of why and under which circumstances various outcomes occur. 458
However, by summarizing the various explanations reported across the reviewed 459 studies, some hypothetical associations can be established. Table 3 Another main finding from the review is the relatively high share of the studies 547 reporting positive economic outcomes-a finding apparently indicating that one key 548 promise of NPM, i.e. improved economic performance, has been fulfilled by the shift 549 toward greater reliance on private delivery. However, some caveats must be raised. 550
None of the reviewed studies considered potential off-setting effects from, for example, 551 cost shifts in the public sector or the size of comparative transaction costs. This is a 552 recurrent and longstanding critique of studies of the economic performance of 553 contracting out in the public sector (Boyne, 1998; Petersen et al. 2017 ). Some of these 554 effects, in particular comparative transaction costs, are implicitly accounted for in the 555 group of reviewed studies comparing overall expenditure levels for park services 556 between municipalities with different levels of contracting out (e.g. Martin and Stein, 557 1992). On the other hand, these studies may again fail to account for any re-allocation 558 or re-investment within park services, e.g. new facilities, of potential cost gains from 559 25 contracting out maintenance services. Earlier estimates of transaction costs associated 560 with contracting out in the public sector more generally indicate that their magnitude (a 561 two per cent point reduction in the level of estimated cost savings) is certainly not 562 tipping the overall balance of economic performance (Hodge, 2000) . 563
Studies comparing the economic performance from contracting out the first 564 time, i.e. a shift from public to private provision, may also to some degree compare 565 service provision of public and private organizations which differ in their comparative 566 advantages and disadvantages as well as governing values. The introduction of 567 competitive tendering and shifts from public to private provision has historically 568 implied a change from one type of organization to another. Clark (1997) , for example, 569 noted that public providers in local governments in the UK prior to the implementation 570 of the UK based versions of NPM reforms were characterized by a unitary and skill-571 based organization based on horticultural (and arboricultural) knowledge and low 572 degrees of formalization of managerial systems. Consequently, public organizations 573 were abruptly situated in competition with private organizations whose business culture 574 was already closely aligned with the governing values, such as cost-efficiency and 575 productivity, inherent in the NPM. In Scandinavia, however, municipal park 576 management witnessed a more incremental and pragmatic approach to the introduction 577 of competition and private contractors in the 1990s and 2000s where public 578 organizations were able to prepare themselves for potential exposure to competition 579 (e.g. Nuppenau, 2009 ). Generically, the two types of organization, i.e. the private 580 contractor and the traditional public provider, can be contrasted as a difference between 581 their orientations toward, respectively, 'inputs' and 'outputs' as well as a difference 582
between organizational values related to, respectively, 'robustness' and 'efficiency' (see outcomes from contracting out maintenance services in urban parks and green spaces. 617
The review was based on an analysis of altogether 13 internationally available studies 618 with regard to type of reported outcomes, explanations for outcomes, methodological 619 basis and country context. The studies covered data from a timespan of four decades 620 and three major country contexts. Four major outcome types -economic, service, 621 management/organisation and staff -were found to be illuminated in the reviewed 622 studies. Economic and managerial performance tended to be evaluated as positive while 623 outcomes for service quality and staff tended to be evaluated as negative. 624
The evaluation of what is known about the outcomes was, however, to some 625 
Improved information level on assets, costs and service levels. Reduced production costs.
Decreased standards and quality of services. Legend: + = mainly positive association, ÷ = mainly negative association, -= no association reported, + / ÷ = highly mixed associations reported
